Within the contemporary philosophical debates over the nature of
perception, the question of whether perception has content in the
first place recently has become a focus of discussion. The most
common view is that it does, but a number of philosophers have
questioned this claim. The issue immediately raises a number of
related questions. What does it mean to say that perception has
content? Does perception have more than one kind of content? Does
perceptual content derive from the content of beliefs or judgments?
Should perceptual content be understood in terms of accuracy
conditions? Is naive realism compatible with holding that
perception has content? This volume brings together philosophers
representing many different perspectives to address these and other
central questions in the philosophy of perception.
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