Emotions shape our mental and social lives. Their relation to
morality is, however, problematic. Since ancient times,
philosophers have disagreed about the place of emotions in
morality. One the one hand, some hold that emotions are disorderly
and unpredictable animal drives, which undermine our autonomy and
interfere with our reasoning. For them, emotions represent a
persistent source of obstacles to morality, as in the case of
self-love. Some virtues, such as prudence, temperance, and
fortitude, require or simply consist in the capacity to counteract
the disruptive effect of emotions. On the other hand, venerable
traditions of thought place emotions such as respect, love, and
compassion at the very heart of morality. Emotions are sources of
moral knowledge, modes of moral recognition, discernment, valuing,
and understanding. Emotions such as blame, guilt, and shame are the
voice of moral conscience, and are central to the functioning of
our social lives and normative practices. New scientific findings
about the pervasiveness of emotions posit new challenges to ethical
theory. Are we responsible for emotions? What is their relation to
practical rationality? Are they roots of our identity or threats to
our autonomy? This volume is born out of the conviction that
philosophy provides a distinctive approach to these problems.
Fourteen original articles, by prominent scholars in moral
psychology and philosophy of mind, offer new arguments about the
relation between emotions and practical rationality, value,
autonomy, and moral identity.
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