A war of attrition is usually conceptualized as a bloody
slogging match, epitomized by imagery of futile frontal assaults on
the Western Front of the First World War. As such, many academics,
politicians, and military officers currently consider attrition to
be a wholly undesirable method of warfare. This first book-length
study of wars of attrition challenges this viewpoint. A historical
analysis of the strategic thought behind attrition demonstrates
that it was often implemented to conserve casualties, not to engage
in a bloody senseless assault. Moreover, attrition frequently
proved an effective means of attaining a state's political aims in
warfare, particularly in serving as a preliminary to decisive
warfare, reducing risk of escalation, and coercing an opponent in
negotiations.
Malkasian analyzes the thought of commanders who implemented
policies of attrition from 1789 to the present. His study includes
figures central to the study of war, such as the Duke of
Wellington, Carl von Clausewitz, B. H. Liddell Hart, General
William Slim, General Douglas MacArthur, General Matthew Ridgeway,
and General William Westmoreland. While special attention is
devoted to the Second World War in the Pacific and the Korean War,
this study notes the utility of attrition during the Cold War, as
the risk of a Third World War rendered more aggressive strategies
unattractive. Increasingly, the United States finds itself facing
conflicts that are not amenable to a decisive military solution in
which opponents seek prolonged war that will inflict as many
casualties as possible on American forces.
General
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