In Moral Animals, Catherine Wilson develops a theory of morality
based on two fundamental premises: first that moral progress
implies the evolution of moral ideals involving restraint and
sacrifice; second that human beings are outfitted by nature with
selfish motivations, intentions, and ambitions that place
constraints on what morality can demand of them. Normative claims,
she goes on to show, can be understood as projective hypotheses
concerning the conduct of realistically-described nonideal agents
in preferred fictional worlds. Such claims differ from empirical
hypotheses, insofar as they cannot be verified by observation and
experiment. Yet many, though not all, moral claims are susceptible
of confirmation to the extent that they command the agreement of
well-informed inquirers. With this foundation in place, Wilson
turns to a defence of egalitarianism intended to address the
objection that the importance of our non-moral projects, our
natural acquisitiveness and partiality, and our meritocratic
commitments render social equality a mere abstract ideal. Employing
the basic notion of a symmetrical division of the co-operative
surplus, she argues that social justice with respect to global
disparities in well-being, and in the condition of women relative
to men, depends on the relinquishment of natural and acquired
advantage that is central to the concept of morality.
General
Is the information for this product incomplete, wrong or inappropriate?
Let us know about it.
Does this product have an incorrect or missing image?
Send us a new image.
Is this product missing categories?
Add more categories.
Review This Product
No reviews yet - be the first to create one!