This is the story of the U.S. Navy's communications intelligence
(COMINT) effort between 1924 and 1941. It races the building of a
program, under the Director of Naval Communications (OP-20), which
extracted both radio and traffic intelligence from foreign
military, commercial, and diplomatic communications. It shows the
development of a small but remarkable organization (OP-20-G) which,
by 1937, could clearly see the military, political, and even the
international implications of effective cryptography and successful
cryptanalysis at a time when radio communications were passing from
infancy to childhood and Navy war planning was restricted to
tactical situations. It also illustrates an organization plagues
from its inception by shortages in money, manpower, and equipment,
total absence of a secure, dedicated communications system, little
real support or tasking from higher command authorities, and major
imbalances between collection and processing capabilities. It
explains how, in 1941, as a result of these problems, compounded by
the stresses and exigencies of the time, the effort misplaced its
focus from Japanese Navy traffic to Japanese diplomatic messages.
Had Navy cryptanalysts been ordered to concentrate on the Japanese
naval messages rather than Japanese diplomatic traffic, the United
States would have had a much clearer picture of the Japanese
military buildup and, with the warning provided by these messages,
might have avoided the disaster of Pearl Harbor.
General
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