During the early years of the Iraq War, the US Army was unable
to translate initial combat success into strategic and political
victory. Iraq plunged into a complex insurgency, and defeating this
insurgency required beating highly adaptive foes. A competition
between the hierarchical and vertically integrated army and
networked and horizontally integrated insurgents ensued. The latter
could quickly adapt and conduct networked operations in a
decentralized fashion; the former was predisposed to fighting via
prescriptive plans under a centralized command and control.
To achieve success, the US Army went through a monumental
process of organizational adaptation -- a process driven by
soldiers and leaders that spread throughout the institution and led
to revolutionary changes in how the army supported and conducted
its operations in Iraq. How the army adapted and the implications
of this adaptation are the subject of this indispensable study.
Intended for policymakers, defense and military professionals,
military historians, and academics, this book offers a solid
critique of the army's current capacity to adapt to likely future
adversary strategies and provides policy recommendations for
retaining lessons learned in Iraq.
General
Is the information for this product incomplete, wrong or inappropriate?
Let us know about it.
Does this product have an incorrect or missing image?
Send us a new image.
Is this product missing categories?
Add more categories.
Review This Product
No reviews yet - be the first to create one!