Using recently released French official documents and a variety
of other sources, this study explains how the French Army, so
recently defeated by the Viet Minh insurgents in Indochina, was
able to successfully defeat the Algerian nationalist rebels on the
battlefield, while nevertheless losing the war at the conference
table. This French success, between 1954 and 1962, was due in large
part to the superior logistical system of the French Army and the
use of the helicopter to enhance French operational mobility.
French counter-mobility measures, particularly the construction of
heavily defended interdiction zones on the eastern and western
borders of Algeria, proved highly effective against the rebels.
Such methods essentially cut off the rebel forces from their bases
and from sources of supply located outside Algeria, and
consequently strangled and destroyed the rebel forces within
Algeria.
No other work on the Algerian War focuses upon the role of
logistics in the outcome of the conflict. The detailed statistical
data and comprehensive description and analysis of the logistical
organizations and methods of both the French and the nationalist
rebels are supplemented by excellent maps. This study also provides
useful insights into the nature of the wars of national liberation
and counter-insurgency doctrines that dominated military affairs in
the mid-20th century.
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