India and Pakistan have been in a state of persistent conflict that
goes back to the very creation of these states after
decolonization. This conflict has resulted in several wars and
continuing armed clashes. After both states became nuclear powers,
one would have expected a fundamental change in the way they wage
war, since it is a fundamental principle of International Relations
theory that nuclear-armed states do not go to war with each other.
But the situation in South Asia seems to defy this principle.
Indias conventional superiority should be neutralized by Pakistans
nuclear capability, while Pakistans risk-taking behavior should be
reduced. But as a matter of fact, the situation has turned out
quite differently: Although large-scale conventional wars have not
occurred, the nuclear status seems to have encouraged conflict and
risk-taking. The number of armed clashes rose. Bluth and Mumtaz
scrutinize the atypical and seemingly paradoxical impact of
nuclearization on the conflict between India and Pakistan, paying
extra attention on the question of how stable this paradoxical
strategic relationship is. They demonstrate that the dominant
paradigm used in the International Relations literature is by far
not adequate to explain the strategic relations between India and
Pakistan and set to work on developing a more coherent explanation.
A must-read for everyone interested in International Relations and
conflict resolution research.
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