Xenakis examines the responses of Soviet experts in American
academia--primarily political scientists, but also economists and
defense scholars who specialized in the USSR--to the unfolding
evidence of Soviet reform during the 1970s and 1980s and to its
ultimate collapse. He concludes that American Sovietologists and
other political scientists were more responsive to the Cold War
consensus--to the needs of the State Department, Defense, and CIA
policy makers and to the official Washington line of the
moment--than to the changing face of the Soviet Union.
As Xenakis makes clear, many of the Cold War ideas and attitudes
shared by Sovietologists--the notion that the USSR was an evil
empire; the idea that Soviet society was irredeemably xenophobic
and indolent; that the Soviet political and economic system could
not be fixed or reformed; and the view that the best way for
Washington to deal with MoscoW's influence was to contain the USSR
through arms races, global, and proxy wars--were reminiscent of the
policies and arguments of the Truman and Eisenhower
administrations, not to the facts on the ground in the 1970s and
1980s. An important work for scholars, students, and researchers
involved with Soviet and Russian studies, international political
and military affairs, intellectual history, and the relationship
between academia and the government.
General
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