Easier Said Than Done: Making the Transition Between Combat
Operations and Stability Operations is another in the Combat
Studies Institute's (CSI) Global War On Terrorism (GWOT) Occasional
Papers series. The impetus for this series that concerns topics
relevant to ongoing and future operations came from the Commanding
General, Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth. Lieutenant
General William S. Wallace, V Corps commander in Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM, directed CSI to examine historical topics that would
benefit American and coalition soldiers and planners in both Iraq
today, and in the broader GWOT spectrum now and in the future. One
of those topics was the transition from combat (Phase III)
operations to stability (Phase IV) operations, to use the current
phasing construct familiar to campaign planners. Mr. David
Cavaleri, a retired Armor lieutenant colonel and current CSI
historian, has produced a study that examines nine critical factors
that should be addressed in stabilization planning and execution.
Mr. Cavaleri then presents a case study of the US occupation of
Japan after World War II, followed by a parallel analysis of the
case study and ongoing stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq
through the lens of the critical planning factors. This study
serves as a bridge between the tactics, techniques, and procedures
(TTP) found in stability operations how-to manuals and the broader
military operations other than war (MOOTW) concepts found in joint
doctrine. Its purpose was to identify key themes that merit
consideration when planning or conducting transitions between
combat operations and stability operations. These themes were
identified by combining a review of joint and US Army stability
operations doctrine with a specific case study analysis of the US
occupation of Japan from 1945 to 1952 and then extrapolated those
themes to current stability operations to assess their
applicability. The Japanese occupation is useful as a case study
because it required that occupation forces address several
challenges similar to those facing current stability operations in
the Middle East, such as a fundamental change in governance
philosophy, a long-term democratization program, a critical
regional security challenge, and a complex economic reconstruction
challenge. This analysis is not designed to serve as a one answer
fits all challenges solution set, but rather as a practical vehicle
for informing time-constrained professionals operating at the
tactical and operational levels. One can easily identify several
instances where the US Army has faced stability operations
challenges; Cuba, Germany, the Philippines, the Dominican Republic,
Panama, and Vietnam immediately come to mind. Each case involved
stability operations challenges unique to its environment, but only
one time during the 20th century did the United States take the
lead in stabilizing the entire infrastructure-political, economic,
industrial, military, educational, and even societal-of a former
enemy. During this complex stability operation, the US Army
implemented a number of planning themes related to transitioning
between the full spectrum operations components of offense/defense
and stability/support. These themes were applied, depending on the
US Army's ability to manipulate each, with varying degrees of
success. A RAND Corporation study published in 2003, titled
America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq, developed
six such themes, traced each through seven case studies, and
concluded by drawing implications for future US military
operations.
General
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