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The Telecommunications Act of 1996: The "Costs" of Managed Competition (Hardcover, 2000 ed.)
Loot Price: R3,009
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The Telecommunications Act of 1996: The "Costs" of Managed Competition (Hardcover, 2000 ed.)
Series: Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy, 36
Expected to ship within 10 - 15 working days
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The Telecommunications Act of 1996 envisioned a competitive
free-for-all in the U.S. telecommunications industry with removal
of barriers to entry in local telecommunications markets and the
lifting of the artificial restrictions that kept the Regional Bell
Operating Companies (RBOCs) out of the interLATA long-distance
market. After close to 5 years, only one RBOC has been granted
permission (controversially) to enter the interLATA market, and
local competition has yet to provide most consumers with meaningful
choices. In addition, the wave of mergers across the industry has
raised the specter of putting the former Bell System back together
again. Policymakers now openly question whether the Act can deliver
what it promised. Three principal themes are developed in this
book. First, there has been a coordination failure between Congress
and the FCC in translating the principles embodied in the Act into
practice. The authors provide evidence for this by analyzing stock
market reactions to legislative and regulatory actions. This
coordination failure was largely predictable, given the ambiguity
in the Act, as well as conflicting jurisdictions between the FCC
and the states. Second, the Act calls for wholesale prices to be
based on cost.' Regulators adopted a costing standard (TELRIC) that
provides a means to subsidize competitive entry in local telephone
service markets. The ready adoption of the TELRIC standard by
regulators is shown to be tied to the third theme: price cap
regulation provides regulators with insurance' against the adverse
effects of competition in local telephone markets. Statistical
analysis reveals that regulators in price cap states set uniformly
lower unbundled network element prices (lower barriers to entry) in
comparison with regulators in rate-of-return and earnings sharing
states. The result is a triumph of regulatory processes over market
processes - the antithesis of the purpose of the Act.
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