Delegation and Agency in International Organizations (Hardcover, New)

Why do states delegate certain tasks and responsibilities to international organizations rather than acting unilaterally or cooperating directly? Furthermore, to what extent do states continue to control IOs once authority has been delegated? Examining a variety of different institutions including the World Trade Organization, the United Nations and the European Commission, this book explores the different methods that states employ to ensure their interests are being served, and identifies the problems involved with monitoring and managing IOs. The contributors suggest that it is not inherently more difficult to design effective delegation mechanisms at international level than at domestic level and, drawing on principal-agent theory, help explain the variations that exist in the extent to which states are willing to delegate to IOs. They argue that IOs are neither all evil nor all virtuous, but are better understood as bureaucracies that can be controlled to varying degrees by their political masters.

General

Imprint:	Cambridge UniversityPress
Country of origin:	United Kingdom
Series:	Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions
Release date:	September 2006
First published:	2006
Editors:	Darren G. Hawkins • David A. Lake • Daniel L. Nielson • Michael J. Tierney
Dimensions:	229 x 152 x 27mm (L x W x T)
Format:	Hardcover
Pages:	428
Edition:	New
ISBN-13:	978-0-521-86209-7
Categories:	Books > Social sciences > Politics & government > International relations > International institutions > General Promotions
LSN:	0-521-86209-4
Barcode:	9780521862097

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