Kant's Inferentialism draws on a wide range of sources to present a
reading of Kant's theory of mental representation as a direct
response to the challenges issued by Hume in A Treatise of Human
Nature. Kant rejects the conclusions that Hume draws on the grounds
that these are predicated on Hume's theory of mental
representation, which Kant refutes by presenting objections to
Hume's treatment of representations of complex states of affairs
and the nature of judgment. In its place, Kant combines an account
of concepts as rules of inference with a detailed account of
perception and of the self as the locus of conceptual norms to form
a complete theory of human experience as an essentially
rule-governed enterprise aimed at producing a representation of the
world as a system of objects necessarily connected to one another
via causal laws. This interpretation of the historical dialectic
enriches our understanding of both Hume and Kant and brings to bear
Kant's insights into mental representation on contemporary debates
in philosophy of mind. Kant's version of inferentialism is both
resistant to objections to contemporary accounts that cast these as
forms of linguistic idealism, and serves as a remedy to misplaced
Humean scientism about representation.
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