The orthodox view of economic policy holds that public deliberation
sets the goals or ends, and then experts select the means to
implement these goals. This assumes that experts are no more than
trustworthy servants of the public interest. David M. Levy and
Sandra J. Peart examine the historical record to consider cases in
which experts were trusted with disastrous results, such as
eugenics, the regulatory use of security ratings, and central
economic planning. This history suggests that experts have not only
the public interest but also their own interests to consider. The
authors then recover and extend an alternative view of economic
policy that subjects experts' proposals to further discussion,
resulting in transparency and ensuring that the public obtains the
best insights of experts in economics while avoiding pitfalls such
as expert bias.
General
Is the information for this product incomplete, wrong or inappropriate?
Let us know about it.
Does this product have an incorrect or missing image?
Send us a new image.
Is this product missing categories?
Add more categories.
Review This Product
No reviews yet - be the first to create one!