Douglas N. Walton considers the question of whether the conventions
of informal conversation can be articulated more precisely than
they are at present. Specifically, he addresses the problem of the
fallacy of ad hominem argumentation as it occurs in natural
settings. Can rules be formulated to determine if criticisms of
apparent hypocrisy in an argument are defensible or refutable?
Walton suggests that they can, and ultimately defends the thesis
that ad hominem reasoning is not fallacious per se. He carries his
analysis to the core of action--theoretic reasoning--by examining a
number of specimen arguments. As suggested by the title, the
conclusion of ad hominem argument is demonstrated to be relative to
the arguer's position. In the appendixes of the book, articles by
Gerald McAuliffe and Gordon R. Lowe illustrate vivid and powerful
cases in which Walton's contentions are put to the test.
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