Do small but wealthy interest groups influence referendums,
ballot initiatives, and other forms of direct legislation at the
expense of the broader public interest? Many observers argue that
they do, often lamenting that direct legislation has,
paradoxically, been captured by the very same wealthy interests
whose power it was designed to curb. Elisabeth Gerber, however,
challenges that argument. In this first systematic study of how
money and interest group power actually affect direct legislation,
she reveals that big spending does not necessarily mean big
influence.
Gerber bases her findings on extensive surveys of the activities
and motivations of interest groups and on close examination of
campaign finance records from 168 direct legislation campaigns in
eight states. Her research confirms what such wealthy interests as
the insurance industry, trial lawyer associations, and tobacco
companies have learned by defeats at the ballot box: if citizens do
not like a proposed new law, even an expensive, high-profile
campaign will not make them change their mind. She demonstrates,
however, that these economic interest groups have considerable
success in using direct legislation to block initiatives that
others are proposing and to exert pressure on politicians. By
contrast, citizen interest groups with broad-based support and
significant organizational resources have proven to be extremely
effective in using direct legislation to pass new laws. Clearly
written and argued, this is a major theoretical and empirical
contribution to our understanding of the role of citizens and
organized interests in the American legislative process.
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