This book offers a reconceptualisation of conventional
deterrence theory, and applies it to enduring rivalries in the
Middle East.
The work argues that many of the problems encountered in the
development of deterrence theory lay in the fact that it was
developed during the Cold War, when the immediate problem it had to
address was how to prevent catastrophic nuclear wars. The logic of
nuclear deterrence compelled a preoccupation with the problem of
stability over credibility; however, because the logic of
conventional deterrence is different, the solution of the tension
between credibility and stability is achieved by deference to
credibility, due to the requirements of reputation and costly
signaling.
This book aims to narrow the gap between theory and evidence. It
explores how a reconceptualization of the theory as a process that
culminates in the internalization of deterrence within enduring
rivalries is better suited to account for its final success: a
finding that has eluded deterrence theorists for long.
This interdisciplinary book will be of much interest to students
of deterrence theory, strategic studies, international security,
Middle Eastern studies and IR in general.
General
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