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Modest Nonconceptualism - Epistemology, Phenomenology, and Content (Hardcover, 1st ed. 2015)
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Modest Nonconceptualism - Epistemology, Phenomenology, and Content (Hardcover, 1st ed. 2015)
Series: Studies in Brain and Mind, 8
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The author defends nonconceptualism, the claim that perceptual
experience is nonconceptual and has nonconceptual content.
Continuing the heated and complex debate surrounding this topic
over the past two decades, she offers a sustained defense of a
novel version of the view, Modest Nonconceptualism, and provides a
systematic overview of some of the central controversies in the
debate. An explication of the notion of nonconceptual content and a
distinction between nonconceptualist views of different strengths
starts off the volume, then the author goes on to defend
participants in the debate over nonconceptual content against the
allegation that their failure to distinguish between a state view
and a content view of (non)conceptualism leads to fatal problems
for their views. Next, she makes a case for nonconceptualism by
refining some of the central arguments for the view, such as the
arguments from fineness of grain, from contradictory contents, from
animal and infant perception, and from concept acquisition. Then,
two central objections against nonconceptualism are rebutted in a
novel way: the epistemological objection and the objection from
objectivity. Modest Nonconceptualism allows for perceptual
experiences to involve some conceptual elements. It emphasizes the
relevance of concept employment for an understanding of conceptual
and nonconceptual mental states and identifies the nonconceptual
content of experience with scenario content. It insists on the
possibility of genuine content-bearing perceptual experience
without concept possession and is thus in line with the Autonomy
Thesis. Finally, it includes an account of perceptual justification
that relies on the external contents of experience and belief, yet
is compatible with epistemological internalism.
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