Why do some industries win substantial protection from the whims
of international trade while others do not? "Privileging Industry"
challenges standard approaches to this question in its examination
of when governments use trade and industrial policy for political
goals. Fiona McGillivray shows why aiding an industry can be a
politically efficient way for a government to redistribute
resources from one industrial sector to another. Taking a
comparative perspective that stands in contrast with the usual
focus on U.S. trade politics, she explores, for example, how
electoral rules, party strength, and industrial geography affect
redistribution politics across countries. How do political
institutions and the geographical dispersion of industries interact
to determine which industries governments privilege? What tests can
assess how governments distribute assistance across industries?
Research has focused on the industries that legislators want to
protect, but just as important is identifying those legislators
able to deliver trade assistance. Assisting an industry requires
both a will and a means. Whether an industry is a good vehicle
through which to redistribute income depends on its geographic
make-up and the country's electoral system. In turn, the electoral
system and party strength affect how legislators' preferences
contribute to policy. McGillivray tests these arguments using a
tariff-based empirical test and nonstandard dependent variables
such as the dispersion of stock prices within fourteen different
capital markets, and government influence in the targeting of plant
closures within declining industries.
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