Scholars of the U.S. House disagree over the importance of
political parties in organizing the legislative process. On the one
hand, non-partisan theories stress how congressional organization
serves members' non-partisan goals. On the other hand, partisan
theories argue that the House is organized to serve the collective
interests of the majority party. This book advances our partisan
theory and presents a series of empirical tests of that theory's
predictions (pitted against others). It considers why procedural
cartels form, arguing that agenda power is naturally subject to
cartelization in busy legislatures. It argues that the majority
party has cartelized agenda power in the U.S. House since the
adoption of Reed's rules in 1890. The evidence demonstrates that
the majority party seizes agenda control at nearly every stage of
the legislative process in order to prevent bills that the party
dislikes from reaching the floor.
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