In his latest work, Macesich examines democracy and its economic
counterpart, the free market, and the place of money (monetary and
fiscal policy as controlled by the state bureaucracy) in such a
system. DeTocqueville warned in the first half of the 19th century
that democracy could falter as a consequence of citizens'
diminished interest in restraining central authority. And now,
there is evidence that vote-maximizing behavior of politicians and
politically induced cycles in such key variables as inflation,
unemployment, government transfers, taxes and monetary growth have
become a critical problem in American democracy. The author
examines, then, how best to consider money, monetary policy and the
monetary regime--increasingly a function of political/bureaucratic
pressures--against the argument for a liberal, freely functioning
trading world and for fully-employed, prosperous countries.
This study considers the constraints that must be placed on the
exercise of discretionary authority by vote maximizing
bureaucracies and political elites if democracy is to thrive and
prosper. Satisfactory resolution of these issues is basic to
reducing monetary uncertainty and stabilizing the long-term price
level, according to Macesich. These issues are deeply rooted in
traditional American ideology and experience, and the author makes
this clear in weaving together historical, institutional,
theoretical, philosophical, and empirical results in the case of
money and monetary policy.
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