This book makes clear how, and why, after World War II American
diplomats tried to make the atom bomb a winning weapon," an
absolute advantage in negotiations with the Soviet Union. But this
policy failed utterly in the 1948 Berlin crisis, and at home the
State Department opposed those scientists who advocated
international cooperation on nuclear matters.
Originally published in 1988.
The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand
technology to again make available previously out-of-print books
from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press.
These paperback editions preserve the original texts of these
important books while presenting them in durable paperback
editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly
increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the
thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since
its founding in 1905.
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