Many large corporations delegate investment decision-making
authority to their divisions. Because they are better informed,
divisional managers should be able to make better decisions than
corporate headquarters. However, they can use this informational
advantage to pursue their own interests. The objective of this work
is to analyze the problem of delegated decision-making within firms
when investment projects are characterized by the possibility to
make subsequent decisions after the initial investment decision has
been made. By analyzing this question, the monograph combines and
unifies two important lines of literature: on the one hand the
literature on controlling investment decisions, on the other hand
the investment valuation literature.
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