This book by one of the world's foremost philosophers in the fields
of epistemology and logic offers an account of suppositional
reasoning relevant to practical deliberation, explanation,
prediction, and hypothesis testing. Suppositions made "for the sake
of the argument" sometimes conflict with our beliefs, and when they
do, some beliefs are rejected and others retained. Thanks to such
hypothetical belief contravention, adding content to a supposition
can undermine conclusions reached without it. Subversion can also
arise because suppositional reasoning is ampliative. These two
types of nonmonotonicity are the focus of this book. A detailed
comparison of nonmonotonicity appropriate to both
belief-contravening and ampliative suppositional reasoning reveals
important differences that have been overlooked. In arguing that
the distinction between belief contravening and inductive
nonmonotonicity plays a far greater role in deliberation and
decision than it is given credit for, this major study will be
required reading for all philosophers and logicians concerned with
conditionals, decision theory, and inductive inference. It will
also interest those in artificial intelligence who work on expert
systems, default reasoning, and nonmonotonic reasoning.
General
Is the information for this product incomplete, wrong or inappropriate?
Let us know about it.
Does this product have an incorrect or missing image?
Send us a new image.
Is this product missing categories?
Add more categories.
Review This Product
No reviews yet - be the first to create one!
Welcome to Loot.co.za!
Sign in / Register |Wishlists & Gift Vouchers |Help | Advanced search
