This study explains the performance of Human Terrain Teams, why the
large majority of commanders found them useful, and why
collectively they did not ameliorate-much less reverse-growing
cross-cultural tensions between U.S. forces and Afghans. It
examines the tremendous challenges the Human Terrain Team program
faced in starting and rapidly expanding a non-traditional military
capability, and why some challenges were met successfully while
others were not. First, a historical analysis explains how external
forces and management decisions affected team performance. An
organizational analysis then explains the variations in team
performance by examining the teams with variables substantiated by
previous studies of small cross-functional teams. Finally, all
available commander observations on Human Terrain Team performance
are analyzed to better determine why commanders were satisfied or
dissatisfied with their teams. The insights from the three
analyses-historical, organizational and commander assessments-are
then integrated. The results demonstrate that Human Terrain Teams
had to overcome numerous organizational limitations to perform
well, but that they were able to meet the expectations of
commanders who did not fully appreciate the optimum role the teams
could play in an integrated counterinsurgency strategy.
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