Incentives and Political Economy (Paperback)

Incentives and Political Economy constructs a normative approach to constitutional design using recent developments in contract theory. It treats political economy as the study of the incentive problems created by the delegation of economic policy to self-interested politicians. Politicians are treated successively as informed supervisors or residual decision-makers. The optimal constitutional responses to the activities of interest groups are characterized in various circumstances, as well as the optimal trade-off between flexibility of decision-making and discretion to pursue personal agendas when the incompleteness of the constitutional contract is recognized.

General

Imprint:	Oxford UniversityPress
Country of origin:	United Kingdom
Series:	Clarendon Lectures in Economics
Release date:	October 2001
First published:	December 2001
Authors:	Jean-Jacques Laffont
Dimensions:	218 x 139 x 15mm (L x W x T)
Format:	Paperback
Pages:	272
ISBN-13:	978-0-19-924868-1
Categories:	Books > Business & Economics > Economics > Political economy Books > Social sciences > Politics & government > Central government > General
LSN:	0-19-924868-0
Barcode:	9780199248681

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