Incentive theory is the most important development in economics in
the last forty years. The principal-agent model is the core of this
theory. This authoritative collection brings together the essential
literature concerning the principal-agent model when no
restrictions on the design of the principal's contract exist in
terms of complexity, enforcement or rationality. Part I covers the
foundations of the principal-agent theory from the first historical
formulation of the problem to the first attempts to formalize it.
Part II deals with the case of moral hazard and adverse selection
is the topic of Part III. Part IV presents contributions on current
research issues such as the impact of communication constraints,
endogenous information structures and multidimensional incentive
problems. The Principal Agent Model will be an indispensable
reference source for all students, researchers and professionals
specialising in this subject.
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