Between 1760 and 1815, British troops campaigned from Manila to
Montreal, Cape Town to Copenhagen, Washington to Waterloo. The
naval dimension of Britain's expansion has been superbly covered by
a number of excellent studies, but there has not been a single
volume that does the same for the army and, in particular, looks at
how and why it became a world-operating force, one capable of
beating the Marathas as well as the French. This book will both
offer a new perspective, one that concentrates on the global role
of the army and its central part in imperial expansion and
preservation, and as such will be a major book for military history
and world history. There will be a focus on what the army brought
to power equations and how this made it a world-level force. The
multi-purpose character of the army emerges as the key point, one
seen in particular in the career of Wellington: while referred to
disparagingly by Napoleon as a 'sepoy general,' Wellington's
ability to operate successfully in India and Europe was not only
impressive but also reflected synergies in experience and acquired
skill that characterised the British army. No other army matched
this. The closest capability was that of Russia able, in 1806-14,
to defeat both the Turks and Napoleon, but without having the
trans-oceanic capability and experience enjoyed by the British
army. The experience was a matter in part of debate, including over
doctrine, as in the tension between the 'Americans' and 'Germans,'
a reference to fields of British campaigning concentration during
the Seven Years War. This synergy proved best developed in the
operations in Iberia in 1809-14, with logistical and combat skills
utilised in India employed in a European context in which they were
of particular value. The books aims to further to address the
question of how this army was achieved despite the strong anti-army
ideology/practice derived from the hostile response to Oliver
Cromwell and to James II. Thus, perception and politics are both
part of the story, as well as the exigencies and practicalities of
conflict, including force structure, command issues, and
institutional developments. At the same time, there was no
inevitability about British success over this period, and it is
necessary to consider developments in the context of other states
and, in particular, the reasons why British forces did well and
that Britain was not dependent alone on naval effectiveness.
General
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