The authors, two of the most prominent game theorists of this
generation, have devoted a number of years to the development of
the theory presented here, and to its economic applications. They
propose rational criteria for selecting one particular uniformly
perfect equilibrium point as the solution of any noncooperative
game. And, because any cooperative game can be remodelled as a
noncooperative bargaining game, their theory defines a one-point
solution for any cooperative game as well.By providing solutions -
based on the same principles of rational behavior - for all classes
of games, both cooperative and noncooperative, both those with
complete and with incomplete information, Harsanyi and Selten's
approach achieves a remarkable degree of theoretical unification
for game theory as a whole and provides a deeper insight into the
nature of game-theoretic rationality.The book applies this theory
to a number of specific game classes, such as unanimity games;
bargaining with transaction costs; trade involving one seller and
several buyers; two-person bargaining with incomplete information
on one side, and on both sides. The last chapter discusses the
relationship of the authors' theory to other recently proposed
solution concepts, particularly the Kohberg-Mertens stability
theory.John C. Harsanyi is Flood Research Professor in Business
Administration and Professor of Economics, University of
California, Berkeley. Reinhard Selten is Professor of Economics
Institute of Social and Economic Sciences: University of Bonn,
Federal Republic of Germany.
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