As economic reform in developing countries has shifted from
macroeconomic stabilization to liberalization, opportunities for
legislators to influence the process and outcome of reform have
increased and their role has become more important. This book
focuses attention on differences in institutional structure, in
political parties and electoral rules, to show how they create
incentives that can explain the varying ways in which legislators
respond to policy initiatives from the executive branch.
In Argentina and the Philippines, presidents proposed similar
fiscal reforms in the 1990s: expanding tax bases, strengthening tax
administration, and redesigning tax revenue-sharing with
subnational governments. Drawing on archival research and
interviews with policy makers, Kent Eaton follows the path of
legislation in these three areas from initial proposal to final law
to reveal how it was shaped by the legislators participating in the
process. Obstacles to the adoption of reform, he demonstrates, are
greater in candidate-centered systems like the Philippines' (where
the cultivation of personal reputations is paramount) than in
party-centered systems like Argentina's (where loyalty to party
leaders is emphasized).
To test his argument further, Eaton looks finally at other kinds
of reform ventured in these two countries and at tax reforms
attempted in some other countries.
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