The tragedy in question is the "personal and national" one that
followed from Lyndon Johnson's decision, in July 1965, to escalate
US involvement in Vietnam. Some hitherto classified documents,
according to political scientist Berman (Univ. of California,
Davis), leave the burden of the war on Johnson's shoulders.
Reconstructing a series of meetings between the president and his
advisors, Berman shows that Secretary of Defense MacNamara wanted
an all-out commitment of 44 US battalions, together with a call-up
of 100,000 reserves. George Ball alone argued that the best
long-term decision would be to "cut the losses" and get out right
away - knowing that Hanoi would subsequently take over but that the
only other choice was commitment to a prolonged, probably losing
war. The only newish item here is a memo by McGeorge Bundy,
Johnson's National Security Advisor, that was critical of
MacNamara's suggestion and raised serious questions about long-term
goals. Everyone else, cabinet members and Joint Chiefs, lined up
near MacNamara; and Bundy, apparently realizing Ball's isolation,
stopped pushing his exasperating questions. Johnson, as is known,
gave Ball full opportunity to express himself - as a show of
listening to all sides, says Berman. (Ball, in his forthcoming
memoirs - p. 310 - tells it differently.) In the end, Johnson went
for escalation; but not all the way. For fear of jeopardizing his
Great Society program, Johnson made the troop commitment; but tried
to soft-pedal the escalation by not asking Congress for a
supporting resolution, by not calling up the reserves, and by
announcing the move at an afternoon press conference rather than
during a prime-time address to the nation. In this way, Johnson the
politician tried to maneuver out of a tough situation - bequeathed
him, Berman notes, by Kennedy - only to get stuck in his own mess.
In blaming Johnson, Berman absolves his advisors; at the same time,
he shows that Johnson's advisors weren't yes-men, and he didn't
bowl them over. None of this, in short, constitutes a new
understanding of our entry into the Vietnam "tragedy." The
narrative is useful to a degree; but Bali's account is the one that
must be seriously considered. (Kirkus Reviews)
"A thoroughly researched and highly perceptive study of the
decisions that turned the tribal struggle in Vietnam into an
American war. Berman's book fully documents the role of domestic
policy in our tragic involvement. As one who watched the process at
firsthand. I commend Professor Berman's book for its fairness and
insight." George W. Ball"
General
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