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Collective Dominance and Collusion - Parallelism in EU and US Competition Law (Hardcover)
Loot Price: R3,555
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Collective Dominance and Collusion - Parallelism in EU and US Competition Law (Hardcover)
Series: New Horizons in Competition Law and Economics series
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This book treats one of the thorniest issues in contemporary
antitrust theory: the role of tacit collusion among oligopolistic
undertakings and the instruments to apply competition law against
its harmful consequences. The author builds a very thorough
parallel among US and European legal traditions, enforcement
possibilities and concrete choices against tacit collusion. The
result is an advanced and entertaining reading to be recommended
both to lawyers and economists that study and practice antitrust.'
- Pier Luigi Parcu, European University Institute, ItalyBy
examining the issue of collusion in EU and US competition law, this
book suggests possible strategies for improving the antitrust
enforcement against parallelism, by exploiting the most advanced
achievements of economic analysis. The book contains a suggested
approach to collusion, in ex ante and ex post perspectives. By
moving from the analysis of the state of art, in terms of law, case
law, and scholarship, Marilena Filippelli analyses inconsistencies
and failures in the current antitrust enforcement toward collusion
and develops a workable parameter for the issue of collective
dominance. The most innovative part of this work goes beyond the
analysis of collective dominance itself and involves the
interference of arts. 101 and 102. The conclusion is a
re-definition of the relationship between those rules - from
dichotomy to redundancy. Finally, the book highlights the antitrust
significance of semi-collusion as a strategy made of collusion and
competition. The author considers economic models equalling, as for
the effects, collusion and semi-collusion and the case law
supporting the qualification of semi-collusion as a species of
collusion. The analysis involves both US and EU systems under the
highly topical economic-oriented approach. It also contains an
original view of European antitrust prohibitions. Because of its
contents and its approach, this book will be attractive to every
academic interested in antitrust law. Moreover, the well-documented
research on parallelism, involving law, case law and scholarship,
makes this book interesting also for competition authorities and
antitrust lawyers. Contents: Introduction Part I: Parallelism in US
Competition Law 1. US Antitrust Policy Towards Parallelism: The Ex
Post Enforcement 2. The US Merger Policy Towards Collusion Part II:
Parallelism in EU Competition Law 3. First Evidence of the
'Oligopoly Problem- in the Enforcement of EU Antitrust Laws 4. The
First Stage of EU Oligopoly Control: Shaping the Category of
Collective Dominance 5. Airtours and its Aftermath Part III: A
Suggested Approach to Collective Dominance 6. Coordinated Effects
in EU Merger Control 7. Abuses of Collective Dominance Section I:
Taxonomy of Collective Dominance Section 2: Dealing with Tacit
Collusion 8. Lessons from Collective Dominance: Re-thinking the
Relationship of Articles 101 and 102 Concluding Remarks: EU and US
Approach to the Oligopoly Problem: An Economic-based Trend toward
Convergence Bibliography Index
General
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