This Element defends mathematical anti-realism against an
underappreciated problem with that view-a problem having to do with
modal truthmaking. Part I develops mathematical anti-realism, it
defends that view against a number of well-known objections, and it
raises a less widely discussed objection to anti-realism-an
objection based on the fact that (a) mathematical anti-realists
need to commit to the truth of certain kinds of modal claims, and
(b) it's not clear that the truth of these modal claims is
compatible with mathematical anti-realism. Part II considers
various strategies that anti-realists might pursue in trying to
solve this modal-truth problem with their view, it argues that
there's only one viable view that anti-realists can endorse in
order to solve the modal-truth problem, and it argues that the view
in question-which is here called modal nothingism-is true.
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