In this lively and, ultimately, disturbing study of policy analysts
who are employed in bureaucracies, the author finds a startling
paradox. The analysts know that the papers they so painstakingly
prepare will not be used; as one analyst remarked, "Either it won't
get done in time, or it won't be good enough, or the person who
wanted it done will have left and no one will know what to do with
it, or the issue will no longer exist." Yet the analysts continue
to work at producing these papers. The means of producing
information is at the heart of the paradox. The process
systematically produces information that is difficult to use
directly in decision-making. Yet analysts can do little to alter
the constraints of the process. They continue to produce papers
because it is their job, they value doing it, and it is their major
means of influencing policy. In so doing they make a unique, though
indirect, contribution to policy making. Drawing on eighteen months
of observation and participation in the work of the policy office
of the U.S. Department of Energy, the author fully investigates the
conditions that create the paradox and the positive as well as the
negative implications of the process of information production in
organizations.
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