This analysis of the war includes examination of IDF and Hezbollah
doctrine, as well as an overview of the operational and tactical
problems encountered by the IDF. The author argues that the Israeli
reliance on poorly understood and controversial Effects-Based
Operations (EBO) and Systemic Operational Design (SOD) wari--
ghting theories, and a nearly singular dependence on air power,
were root causes of Israeli problems. Additionally, after years of
counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in the Gaza Strip and West Bank
territories, IDF ground forces were tactically unprepared and
untrained to i-- ght against a determined Hezbollah force that
conducted what was, in many ways, a conventional, i-- xed-position
defense. In researching this study, Mr. Matthews interviewed
several prominent IDF ofi-- cers and other experts in the i-- eld.
Originally published by the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
General
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