The word 'ought' is one of the core normative terms, but it is also
a modal word. In this book Matthew Chrisman develops a careful
account of the semantics of 'ought' as a modal operator, and uses
this to motivate a novel inferentialist account of why
ought-sentences have the meaning that they have. This is a
metanormative account that agrees with traditional descriptivist
theories in metaethics that specifying the truth-conditions of
normative sentences is a central part of the explanation of their
meaning. But Chrisman argues that this leaves important
metasemantic questions about what it is in virtue of which
ought-sentences have the meanings that they have unanswered. His
appeal to inferentialism aims to provide a viable
anti-descriptivist but also anti-expressivist answer to these
questions.
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