1.1 Goals 1.1.1 I have two main goals in this book. The first is to
give an account of the moral significance of merely possible
persons - persons who, relative to a particular 1 circumstance, or
possible future or world, could but in fact never do exist. I call
that account Variabilism. My second goal is to use Variabilism to
begin to address the problem of abortion. 1.1.2 We ought to do the
best we can for people. And we consider this obligation to extend
to people who are, relative to a world, existing or future. But
does it extend to merely possible people as well? And, if it does,
then does it extend to making things better for them by way of
bringing them into existence? If we say that surely it doesn't,
does that then mean that our obligation to do the best we can for
people does not, after all, extend to the merely possible - that
the merely p- sible do not matter morally? But if the merely
possible do not matter morally, then doesn't that mean that it
would be permissible for us to bring them into miserable existences
- and even obligatory to do just that - in the case where bringing
the merely possible into miserable existences creates additional
wellbeing for existing 1 References to merely possible persons and,
later on, to persons who do exist - existing persons
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