Optimal tax design attempts to resolve a well-known trade-off:
namely, that high taxes are bad insofar as they discourage people
from working, but good to the degree that, by redistributing
wealth, they help insure people against productivity shocks. Until
recently, however, economic research on this question either
ignored people's uncertainty about their future productivities or
imposed strong and unrealistic functional form restrictions on
taxes. In response to these problems, the new dynamic public
finance was developed to study the design of optimal taxes given
only minimal restrictions on the set of possible tax instruments,
and on the nature of shocks affecting people in the economy. In
this book, Narayana Kocherlakota surveys and discusses this
exciting new approach to public finance.
An important book for advanced PhD courses in public finance
and macroeconomics, "The New Dynamic Public Finance" provides a
formal connection between the problem of dynamic optimal taxation
and dynamic principal-agent contracting theory. This connection
means that the properties of solutions to principal-agent problems
can be used to determine the properties of optimal tax systems. The
book shows that such optimal tax systems necessarily involve asset
income taxes, which may depend in sophisticated ways on current and
past labor incomes. It also addresses the implications of this new
approach for qualitative properties of optimal monetary policy,
optimal government debt policy, and optimal bequest taxes. In
addition, the book describes computational methods for approximate
calculation of optimal taxes, and discusses possible paths for
future research.
General
Is the information for this product incomplete, wrong or inappropriate?
Let us know about it.
Does this product have an incorrect or missing image?
Send us a new image.
Is this product missing categories?
Add more categories.
Review This Product
No reviews yet - be the first to create one!