This book provides a theory capable of explaining the patterns
of public expenditures and taxation that occur under representative
government. Economists and political scientists have come to
realize that issues of public policy and public finance cannot be
solved on the naive assumption that these are problems tackled by a
government that exists only to serve the public good. Instead,
government must be understood as one of the major economic
institutions of society, one that behaves like more familiar
economic institutions--the household and the firm--though the
market it confronts is a market for policies rather than for goods
and services. Albert Breton's pathbreaking work remains important
in taking us toward a theory of representative government that
enables an understanding of the observed behavior of political
institutions.
The author's analysis is cast in a relatively simple demand,
supply and demand-supply-equilibrium framework, using the tools of
marginal and stability analysis to explain the forces that
influence and determine the flow of resources as they are allocated
between competing ends in the public sector. The book presents a
model of demand by citizens, who are assumed to be maximizing their
desires for specific public policies and private goods, and a model
of the supply of public policies by politicians and bureaucrats,
who are assumed to be maximizing the probability of their
re-election and the size of their budgets. Breton defines
government policies and the institutional framework for collective
choices in terms that render them amenable to further analysis.
The main accomplishment of Breton's theory is that it provides
the ability to analyze the interaction of individuals and generates
testable propositions about the behavior of these individuals as
well as about the behavior of public expenditures and taxation in
more aggregative terms. In this way the book will be useful to
students of economics, economists, and those interested in economic
theory.
"Albert Breton" is professor emeritus of economics at the
University of Toronto. He was once director of research for The
Social Research Group in Montreal. His articles have been widely
published in major journals and some of his recent books include
"Rational Foundations of Democratic Politics" and "Political
Extremism and Rationality" (with Gianluigi Galeotti, Pierre Salmon,
and Ronald Wintrobe) and "Bijuralism: An Economic Approach" (with
Michael J. Trebilcock).
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