This book is a study of the politics of redistribution and
inequality in political unions. It addresses two questions: why
some political systems have more centralized systems of
interpersonal redistribution than others, and why some political
unions make larger efforts to equalize resources among their
constituent units than others. This book presents a new theory of
the origin of fiscal structures in systems with several levels of
government. The argument points to two major factors to account for
the variation in redistribution: the interplay between economic
geography and political representation on the one hand, and the
scope of interregional economic externalities on the other. To test
the empirical implications derived from the argument, the book
relies on in-depth studies of the choice of fiscal structures in
unions as diverse as the European Union, Canada, and the United
States in the aftermath of the Great Depression; Germany before and
after Reunification; and Spain after the transition to democracy.
General
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