The establishment of electoral systems in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
and Uzbekistan presents a complex set of empirical puzzles as well
as a theoretical challenge. Why did three states with similar
cultural, historical, and structural legacies establish such
different electoral systems? How did these distinct outcomes result
from strikingly similar institutional design processes? Explaining
these puzzles requires understanding not only the outcome of
institutional design but also the intricacies of the process that
led to this outcome. Moreover, the transitional context in which
the three states designed new electoral rules necessitates an
approach that explicitly links process and outcome in a dynamic
setting. This book provides such an approach. It depicts
institutional design as a transitional bargaining game in which the
dynamic interaction between the structural-historical and
immediate-strategic contexts directly shapes actors' perceptions of
shifts in their relative power, and hence, their bargaining
strategies. Thus, it both builds on the key insights of the
dominant approaches to explaining institutional origin and change
and transcends these approaches by moving beyond the structure
versus agency debate.
General
Imprint: |
Cambridge UniversityPress
|
Country of origin: |
United Kingdom |
Series: |
Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics |
Release date: |
June 2008 |
First published: |
March 2008 |
Authors: |
Pauline Jones Luong
|
Dimensions: |
229 x 152 x 20mm (L x W x T) |
Format: |
Paperback - Trade
|
Pages: |
344 |
ISBN-13: |
978-0-521-06685-3 |
Categories: |
Books >
Business & Economics >
Economics >
Political economy
|
LSN: |
0-521-06685-9 |
Barcode: |
9780521066853 |
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