Baker and his colleagues provide a blend of the theoretical and
the empirical evidence in an examination of the nature of
bureaucracy under non-democratic, authoritarian forms of
government, whether on the right, as in Portugal, or the left, as
in Bulgaria. In all these instances, the bureaucracy was
constructed to serve the distorted interests of centralized,
unaccountable power. Following the remarkable spread of democracy
in the seventies in Iberia, the eighties in much of Latin America,
parts of Asia and Africa, and the nineties in the former USSR and
the Warsaw Pact countries, the main focus was on reforming the
economy and the political institutions.
Distinguished scholars concentrate on the inherited
bureaucracy--the arm of government with which the people most often
have to deal. They highlight the undemocratic, and sometimes
antidemocratic, nature of the civil service that is supposed to
serve democracy. Others consider the nature of reform as
experienced, and as needed, why there is no major policy for real
reform of the bureaucracy in many countries, and the similar
experience of reforming from the left and the right. Contributors
discuss specific experiences as case studies and examine the more
general question of what lessons can be learned from this unique
perspective into comparative public administration reform.
Essential reading for scholars, students, policy makers, and others
involved with comparative government and public administration.
General
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