This comprehensive study offers a balanced assessment of
libertarian accounts of free will. Bringing to bear recent work on
action, causation, and causal explanation, Clarke defends a type of
event-causal view from popular objections concerning rationality
and diminished control. He subtly explores the extent to which
event-causal accounts can secure the things for the sake of which
we value free will, judging their success here to be limited.
Clarke then sets out a highly original agent-causal account, one
that integrates agent causation and nondeterministic event
causation. He defends this view from a number of objections but
argues that we should find the substance causation required by any
agent-causal account to be impossible. Clarke concludes that if a
broad thesis of incompatibilism is correct--one on which both free
will and moral responsibility are incompatible with
determinism--then no libertarian account is entirely adequate.
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