In the last decades, the United States Army has often been involved
in missions other than conventional warfare. These include
low-intensity conflicts, counterinsurgency operations, and
nation-building efforts. Although non-conventional warfare
represents the majority of missions executed in the past sixty
years, the Army still primarily plans, organizes, and trains to
fight conventional ground wars. Consequently, in the last ten
years, there has been considerable criticism regarding the military
s inability to accomplish tasks other than conventional war. Failed
states and the threat they represent cannot be ignored or solved
with conventional military might. In order to adapt to this new
reality, the U.S. Army must innovate. This text examines the
conditions that have allowed or prevented the U.S. Army to innovate
for nation-building effectively. By doing so, it shows how military
leadership and civil-military relations have changed.
Nation-building refers to a type of military occupation where the
goal is regime change or survival, a large number of ground troops
are deployed, and both military and civilian personnel are used in
the political administration of an occupied country, with the goals
of establishing a productive economy and a stable government. Such
tasks have always been a challenge for the U.S. military, which is
not normally equipped or trained to undertake them. Using military
effectiveness as the measurement of innovative success, the book
analyzes several U.S. nation-building cases, including post-War
World War II Germany, South Korea from 1945-1950, the Vietnam War,
and Operation Iraqi Freedom. By doing so, it reveals the conditions
that enabled military innovation in one unique case (Germany) while
explaining what prevented it in the others. This variation of
effectiveness leads to examine prevailing military innovation
theories, threat-based accounts, quality of military organizations,
and civil-military relations. This text comes at a critical time as
the U.S. military faces dwindling resources and tough choices about
its force structure and mission orientation. It will add to the
growing debate about the role of civilians, military reformers, and
institutional factors in military innovation and effectiveness."
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