This study offers a new perspective on the origins of the Second
World War by comparing and contrasting military planning in seven
nations in the two decades before 1939 (and, in the case of the
United States and Soviet Russia, before 1941). Developing themes
over time and across military cultures allows the authors to
provide a comparative framework in which to survey how military
planning and foreign policy were interwoven and how these
connections produced divergent national strategies in the context
of differing nationalities, military organizations, and societies.
The contributors to this volume have consciously employed a wide
interpretation of military history by emphasizing the interplay of
social, political, diplomatic, and economic factors with military
concerns, as well as the relationship between war and society.
For example, the German army developed its concept of
"blitzkrieg" by examining military theory generated within the
General Staff before 1918, and by considering the new political
circumstances in which the Weimar state and its Nazi successor
found themselves as a result of the Versailles Treaty. Despite its
ultimate success, the German concept was merely abstract and
theoretical until the combined use of armor and air power was
employed effectively in Poland in the autumn of 1939 and in Western
Europe during the spring of 1940. In contrast, the French defensive
strategy built around the use of the Maginot Line was illustrative
of a mainly defensive foreign policy, while British appeasement
policy reflected the diminished level of military preparedness that
was possible throughout the 1930s.
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