Most expressions in natural language are vague. But what is the
best semantic treatment of terms like 'heap', 'red' and 'child'?
And what is the logic of arguments involving this kind of vague
expression? These questions are receiving increasing philosophical
attention, and in this book, first published in 2000, Rosanna Keefe
explores the questions of what we should want from an account of
vagueness and how we should assess rival theories. Her discussion
ranges widely and comprehensively over the main theories of
vagueness and their supporting arguments, and she offers a powerful
and original defence of a form of supervaluationism, a theory that
requires almost no deviation from standard logic yet can
accommodate the lack of sharp boundaries to vague predicates and
deal with the paradoxes of vagueness in a methodologically
satisfying way. Her study will be of particular interest to readers
in philosophy of language and of mind, philosophical logic,
epistemology and metaphysics.
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