Wittgenstein's Account of Truth challenges the view that semantic
antirealists attribute to Wittgenstein: that we cannot meaningfully
call verification-transcendent statements "true." Ellenbogen argues
that Wittgenstein would not have held that we should revise our
practice of treating certain statements as true or false, but
instead would have held that we should revise our view of what it
means to call a statement true. According to the dictum "meaning is
use, " what makes it correct to call a statement "true" is not its
correspondence with how things are, but our criterion for
determining its truth. What it means for us to call a statement
"true" is that we currently judge it true, knowing that we may some
day revise the criteria whereby we do so.
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