In September of 2001, 90% of America received most of their news on
the terrorist attacks against the United States from television; a
number that would hold steady at 89% throughout Operation Iraqi
Freedom (OIF). In April of 2003 while the United States led the
coalition of the willing in OIF, many retired officers stated on
television that the Department of Defense had not planned and
resourced the war properly, resulting in an operation that would
proceed longer than expected. Unsecured supply lines and a shortage
of troops involved in the campaign were the largest criticisms,
earning these pundits a sharp response from the Secretary of
Defense, members of Congress and other general officers, both
retired and serving. As America fights her first war of the
twenty-first century, one that has exceeded the length of World War
II, Americans will continue to turn to the television for news, and
along with the news, they will continue to hear commentaries and
opinions from retired military leaders. With public opinion so
important in America's Global War on Terrorism, are these pundits
shaping opinion to the extent that they are affecting policy within
the executive branch of the government? Is this effect positive or
negative and should these pundits be banned, encouraged or coached?
With such disparate opinions, there is bound to be debate, and in
the absence of a constitutional amendment, the experts are here to
stay. This monograph will explore both sides of the issue and
attempt to answer the question: Through appearances on television,
do military pundits influence public opinion and how does that
affect military policy during times of conflict within the
executive branch of the government? To prove that pundits do not
influence policy within the executive branch of the government, but
rather echo and support public opinion and add to the friction of
war, the monograph will use Clasuewitz' paradoxical trinity as a
framework and use three case studies, Desert Storm, Allied Force
and OIF, to show the role and relevance of pundits during times of
conflict. The comments alluding to the utility and professionalism
of punditry made by Secretary Rumsfeld, Senator Warner and General
Myers deserve a closer look, so the monograph will next briefly
explore the professional ramifications of punditry. Finally, the
findings and recommendations will address the impact of pundits and
discuss ways they can be used to America's advantage in the future.
Throughout the three case studies of Desert Storm, Allied Force and
OIF, one can find numerous examples of how pundits opined, but
there is very little evidence that their discourse had any direct
effect on policy or public opinion. In each case however, their
commentaries accomplished three things: They informed the public,
spurred debate, and added to the war's friction in the executive
branch. Informing the public was a constant, whether in triumph or
adversity, the public could count on military analysts to explain
what was happening and why. However, the nature of each war
dictated the amount of criticism and debate the pundits spurred,
and the three factors that influenced this was public support, the
tactics employed and the clarity of the political strategy. While
their commentaries may have shaped existing public opinion, there
is no evidence that supports pundits creating public opinion.
General
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