How do military organizations assess strategic policy in war? In
this book Scott Gartner develops a theory to explain how military
and government leaders evaluate wartime performance, how much they
change strategies in response to this evaluation, and why they are
frequently at odds when discussing the success or failure of
strategic performance. Blending history, decision theory, and
mathematical modeling, Gartner argues that military personnel do
reevaluate their strategies and that they measure the performance
of a strategy through quantitative, "dominant" indicators. But
different actors within a government use different indicators of
success: some will see the strategy as succeeding when others see
it as failing because of their different dominant indicators.
Gartner tests his argument with three case studies: the British
shift to convoys in World War I following the German imposition of
unrestricted submarine warfare; the lack of change in British naval
policy in the Battle of the Atlantic following the German
introduction of Wolf Packs in World War II; and the American
decision to deescalate in Vietnam after the Tet Offensive. He also
tests his approach in a nonwar situation, analyzing the Carter
Administration's decision to launch the hostage rescue attempt. In
each case, his dominant indicator model better predicts the
observed behavior than either a standard-organization or an
action-reaction approach.
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