An informed and revelatory reappraisal of Sino-Soviet relations
from the close of WW II through October 1950, when the People's
Republic of China entered the Korean conflict. Drawing on hitherto
untapped archives (including a collection of Mao's papers),
Goncharov (a Russian academic and advisor to Boris Yeltsin), Lewis
(Chinese Politics/Stanford), and Litai (a researcher at Stanford's
Center for International Security and Arms Control) shed much fresh
light on an alliance that was appreciably more complex than
previously imagined. In particular, they dash any notion that Kim
Il Sung's assault on South Korea was a carefully coordinated
conspiracy. Indeed, they argue, the decision to invade (though
backed by Stalin) was a reckless gamble, coming as it did in bits
and pieces. But while China's rulers were reluctant dragons in
Korea, Mao clung to the lessons he'd learned from enervating civil
strife in his dealings with Stalin. For both strongmen, personal
visions of national security were paramount in their foreign
policies and negotiations with one another; among other
consequences, each believed that he could bend Kim's adventurism to
his own ends. But while Moo was intent on unifying China and
keeping it independent of the Kremlin (whose economic and military
aid he nonetheless needed), by mid-1949, events had narrowed his
strategic options. Meanwhile, the formation of NATO presented
Stalin with the prospect of stalemate in Europe, inducing him to
look for protection along his vast domain's eastern flanks. For all
their ruthless resolve, however, Moscow and Beijing failed to
discern Washington's determination to stem what it deemed a red
tide in spheres of vital interest. Nor did Marxist ideology play an
important role in the Sino-Soviet partnership - built largely on
mutual suspicion and iron-fisted perceptions of self-interest. A
masterful appreciation of the tangled webs woven in the cause of
power politics during the early years of the cold war. (Kirkus
Reviews)
Uncertain partners tells for the first time the inside story of the
creation of the Sino-Soviet alliance and the origins of the Korean
War. Using major new documentary sources, including cables and
letters between Mao Zedong and Stalin, and interviews with key
Russian, Chinese, and Korean participants, the book focuses on the
domestic and foreign policy decision-making in all three countries
from 1945 through October 1950. The authors examine the complex
relations between Stalin, Chiang Kai-shek, and Mao during the last
year of the Chinese civil war and the emergence of the Cold War.
They show how the interplay of perceptions, national security
policies, and personalities shaped those relations and were used by
the North Korean leader Kim Il Sung to win backing for the invasion
of South Korea. The authors also examine the Sino-Soviet alliance,
drawing on hitherto unknown secret protocols and understandings and
the records of high-level planning that led to the invasion and to
the Chinese intervention in Korea. The book is illustrated with 42
photographs and two maps and is the fourth volume in the series,
Studies in International Security and Arms Control, sponsored by
the Center for International Security and Arms Control at Stanford
University.
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